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I. INTRODUCTION 
People with severe mental illness1 continue to be executed in the United 
States.2 Though there are constitutional prohibitions against executing 
“insane” defendants,3 many people with severe mental illness are not 
considered to be “insane” and are still executed.4 Defendants with severe 
mental illness facing the death penalty often argue that the impairment from 
their illness should make them constitutionally ineligible for execution.  5 These 
defendants argue that their impairment is sufficiently similar to people with 
 
 1 Some sources prefer to use the term “severe mental disorder or disability.” I mean the term “severe 
mental illness” to cover the same conditions as in American Bar Association Recommendation 
Number 122A, adopted by the House of Delegates on August 7–8, 2006. 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/death_penalty_moratorium/m
ental_illness_policies.authcheckdam.pdf  (2006) at 6–7 [hereinafter ABA Recommendation 122A] 
(describing the conditions that would qualify as severe mental disorder or disability, including “Axis 
I diagnoses” such as “schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders, mania, major depressive disorder, 
and dissociative disorders” and other conditions that cause significant disfunction). 
 2 Mentally Ill Prisoners Who Were Executed, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER (last visited 
Sept. 4, 2019), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/policy-issues/mental-illness/mentally-ill-prisoners-who-
were-executed (listing recent executions of inmates who had mental illness). 
 3 See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986) (“The Eighth Amendment prohibits the State 
from inflicting the penalty of death upon a prisoner who is insane.”). 
 4 See Frank R. Baumgartner and Betsy Neill, Does the death penalty target people who are mentally 
ill? We checked., THE WASHINGTON POST (Apr. 3, 2017) 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/04/03/does-the-death-penalty-target-
people-who-are-mentally-ill-we-checked/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.ba1a7bb202d8 (reporting that 
people with severe mental illness are executed despite their disability). 
 5 See, e.g., Smith v. Davis, 927 F.3d 313, 339 (5th Cir. 2019) (“Smith asks us to affirm the district 
court’s grant of habeas relief on the basis that evolving standards of decency render those with 
‘severe mental  illness’ ineligible for the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment.”). See also 
State v. Kleypas, 382 P.3d 373, 445–46 (Kan. 2016) (surveying cases that have addressed the issue of 
whether mental impairment ought to constitutionally bar the death penalty in appeals by death row 
defendants).  
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intellectual disability,6 whom the Supreme Court held to be constitutionally 
ineligible for the death penalty in Atkins v. Virginia.7 Legal commentators and 
legal and medical professional organizations have also argued for a new 
prohibition against executing people who were significantly impaired by severe 
mental illness at the time of their crime. 8 However, no court has accepted this 
argument.9  
This article argues that courts or legislatures should prohibit the execution 
of people with severe mental illness who were significantly impaired by their 
illness at the time of their crime in light of recent Supreme Court death penalty 
interpretation of Atkins. Defendants who were significantly impaired by severe 
mental illness at the time of their crime should not be eligible for the death 
penalty because they have sufficiently reduced culpability. 10 This reduced 
culpability, as for defendants with intellectual disability in Atkins and juveniles 
in Roper v. Simmons,11 cannot be adequately accounted for in sentencing.12 A 
new prohibition should therefore be created and operate as a dispositive 
mitigating factor against imposing the death penalty. 
 
 6 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) [hereinafter Atkins] (concluding that “death is not a 
suitable punishment for a mentally retarded criminal.”). The Atkins court used the term “mentally 
retarded” but the currently-accepted term referring to the same condition is “intellectual disability,” 
which I will use throughout this comment. See, e.g., Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 704 (2014) (noting 
the change in accepted terminology from “mental retardation” to “intellectual disability” as describing 
identical phenomena, which is reflected in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder 
(DSM-5)). Major diagnostic systems in the United States define intellectual disability as a 
developmental condition that is characterized by significant deficits in both intellectual functioning 
and adaptive behavior, including conceptual, social and practical skills. Marc J. Tassé, Defining 
intellectual disability: Finally we all agree…almost, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION 
(Sept. 2016, https://www.apa.org/pi/disability/resources/publications/newsletter/2016/09/intellectual-
disability). 
 7 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320–21 (holding that executing people with intellectual disability violates the 
Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment). 
 8 See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, What Atkins Could Mean For People With Mental Illness, 33 N.M. 
L. REV. 293 (2003) (advocating for extending Atkins to people with mental illness). See also ABA 
Recommendation 122A, at 5 (recommending a prohibition on executing “persons with severe mental 
disabilities whose demonstrated impairments of mental and emotional functioning at the time of the 
offense would render a death sentence disproportionate to their culpability.”). 
 9 Kleypas, 382 P.3d at 445–46. See also Part V infra (listing cases that have considered and rejected 
this contention when raised by a death row defendant). 
 10 See Part II(B) infra (arguing that people with severe mental illness who were significantly impaired at 
the time of their crime have sufficiently reduced culpability to be eligible for a death penalty 
exemption). 
 11 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (holding that defendants who were juveniles at the time 
of their crime had sufficiently reduced culpability to be ineligible for the death penalty under the 
Eighth Amendment). 
 12 See Part VII(A) infra (arguing that impairment due to severe mental illness cannot be adequately 
accounted for in sentencing). 
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A new prohibition of this kind faces two significant hurdles that can be 
overcome by sensible qualifications informed by Supreme Court decisions 
interpreting Atkins. The first hurdle is determining which defendants have 
“severe mental illness.”13 This article argues that an appropriate solution would 
be to rely on the standards of medical professionals to determine which 
defendants have “severe mental illness.” This solution would align with the 
Supreme Court’s approach in recent cases interpreting Atkins. Recent 
Supreme Court cases interpreting Atkins have relied extensively on the 
standards of medical professionals to determine which defendants have 
intellectual disability for the purpose of exempting them from the death 
penalty.14 A similar reliance on medical professionals for defining “severe 
mental illness” would be appropriate in light of these cases.  
The second hurdle for a new prohibition is to account for variations in 
impairment from severe mental illness that varies the level of reduced 
culpability for people with severe mental illness. The variation in impairment 
among and within mental illnesses necessitates a more individuated approach 
than for people with intellectual disability and juveniles.15 Severe mental illness 
is not often as pervasively disabling as intellectual disability or youth. People 
with severe mental illness do not all have reduced culpability and those that 
do are often not disabled all of the time. A prohibition on executing people 
with severe mental illness must account for this distinction by individuating the 
approach. This can be accomplished by requiring that that the defendant’s 
severe mental illness caused significant impairment at the time of the crime 
that sufficiently reduced his or her culpability.16 The requirement would also 
resolve many of the objections to category-defining problems, as discussed 
further below. The significant impairment requirement, along with a definition 
of “severe mental illness” informed by medical professionals, offers a sensible 
and workable expansion of death penalty protections. This article works to 
justify this approach and examine the current state of the law on the issue. 
II. IMPAIRMENTS FROM SEVERE MENTAL ILLNESS CAN SUFFICIENTLY 
 
 13 See, e.g., People v. Mendoza, 62 Cal.4th 856, 911 (Cal. 2016) (rejecting defendant’s proposed 
exemption from the death penalty due to his mental illness in part because the “defendant [did] not 
offer a definition of what level of mental illness would constitute serious mental illness.”). 
 14 See, e.g., Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1044 (2017). 
 15 See ABA Recommendation 122A, at 7 (explaining that, for people with severe mental illness, 
“preclusion of a death sentence based on diagnosis alone would not be sensible, because the 
symptoms of these disorders are much more variable than those associated with retardation or other 
disabilities covered by the Recommendation’s first paragraph.”). 
 16 See id. at 7–9 (explaining how a significant impairment requirement might work). 
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REDUCE CULPABILITY TO QUALIFY FOR A DEATH PENALTY EXEMPTION 
The Supreme Court in Atkins found that as groups people with intellectual 
disability have sufficiently reduced culpability to be categorically ineligible for 
the death penalty. The Court focused on cognitive, judgmental, and social 
impairments of people in these groups to make this determination. People 
with severe mental illness, as defined below, have similar impairments that 
sufficiently reduce their culpability as a group that should make them ineligible 
for the death penalty. 
A. The Reduced Culpability of People With Intellectual Disability 
The Supreme Court explained in Atkins the relevant impairments of 
people with intellectual disability that reduce their culpability.17 The Court 
found that people with intellectual disability are not often so impaired to be 
incompetent to stand trial because they “frequently know the difference 
between right and wrong.”18 However, because of “their disabilities in areas of 
reasoning, judgment, and control of their impulses . . . they do not act with the 
level of moral culpability that characterizes the most serious adult criminal 
conduct.”19 By definition, people with intellectual disability “have diminished 
capacities to understand and process information, to communicate, to abstract 
from mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to 
control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others.”20 These 
impairments are relevant not only because they reduce culpability, but because 
these impairments “can jeopardize the reliability and fairness of capital 
proceedings” against defendants with intellectual disability.21 The Court noted 
that people with intellectual disability “may be less able to give meaningful 
assistance to their counsel and are typically poor witnesses, and their 
demeanor may create an unwarranted impression of lack of remorse for their 
crimes.”22  Due to these impairments, the Supreme Court found that executing 
people with intellectual disability violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition 
against cruel and unusual punishment.23  
 
 17 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320.  
 18 Id. at 318. 
 19 Id. at 306. 
 20 Id. at 318. 
 21 Id. at 306–07. 
 22 Id. at 320–21. 
 23 Id. at 321. 
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B. Severe Mental Illnesses Can Similarly Reduce Culpability 
People with significant impairment from severe mental illness at the time 
of their crime have sufficiently reduced culpability based on the factors 
identified by the Supreme Court in Atkins. The definition of “severe mental 
illness” in American Bar Association Recommendation 122A presents a good 
functional definition based on agreements by medical and legal professionals.24 
The Recommendation was created by a task force of legal and mental health 
professionals and was officially endorsed by the American Psychological 
Association and American Psychiatric Association among others.25 
Recommendation 122A defines severe as signifying “a disorder that is roughly 
equivalent to disorders that mental health professionals would consider the 
most serious ‘Axis I diagnoses.’ These disorders include schizophrenia and 
other psychotic disorders, mania, major depressive disorder, and dissociative 
disorders – with schizophrenia being by far the most common disorder seen 
in capital defendants.”26 The Recommendation task force explicitly excluded 
Antisocial Personality Disorder and the voluntary use of drugs or alcohol from 
eligibility for the exemption because these conditions do not lessen culpability 
or deterrability.27 The Recommendation also explains that “[s]ome conditions 
that are not considered an Axis I condition might also, on rare occasions, 
become ‘severe’ as that word is used in this Recommendation.”28  
These conditions sufficiently reduce culpability. The Recommendation 
explains that “In their acute state, all of these disorders are typically associated 
with delusions (fixed, clearly false beliefs), hallucinations (clearly erroneous 
perceptions of reality), extremely disorganized thinking, or very significant 
disruption of consciousness, memory and perception of the environment.”29 
These impairments negatively impact the ability of people with severe mental 
illness in “reasoning, judgment, and control of their impulses,” which the 
Supreme Court found to reduce culpability in Atkins.30 Considering the 
serious impairments caused by severe mental illness, people with significant 
impairment from severe mental illness should be considered to have 
 
 24 ABA Recommendation 122A (2006), at 6–7. 
 25 Id. at 3.  
 26 Id. at 6. 
 27 Id. at 9. 
 28 Id. at 6–7 (“For instance, some persons whose predominant diagnosis is a personality disorder, which 
is an Axis II disorder, may at times experience more significant dysfunction. Thus, people with 
borderline personality disorder can experience ‘psychotic-like symptoms . . . during times of stress.’ 
However, only if these more serious symptoms occur at the time of the capital offense would the 
predicate for this Recommendation’s exemption be present.”). 
 29 Id. at 6.  
 30 Atkins, 536 U.S. 304 at 306. 
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sufficiently reduced culpability to be considered for a categorical death penalty 
exemption.  
III. DEFERENCE TO THE DEFINITIONS OF MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS WOULD RESOLVE BASIC CATEGORY PROBLEMS OF A 
NEW PROHIBITION 
Some courts have refused to create a new death penalty exemption in part 
because of concerns about defining a category of mental illness that would be 
“severe” or “serious” enough to account for sufficiently reduce culpability.31 A 
simple solution would be to rely on the standards of medical professionals to 
define “severe mental illness” as in ABA Recommendation 122A.32 This 
approach would also be consistent with the approach of the Supreme Court 
in recent decisions interpreting Atkins. In Hall v. Florida33 and Moore v. 
Texas,34 the Court required states to conform to the clinical definitions of 
intellectual disability in applying Atkins.35 Along with the proposed significant 
impairment requirement that necessitates an individuated analysis,36 deferring 
to medical professionals’ definition of “severe mental illness” would resolve 
basic category problems of a new death penalty exemption.  
A. Supreme Court Deference to the Definitions of Medical Professionals in 
Hall and Moore 
In Hall, the Supreme Court required states to conform to “clinical 
definitions” when determining whether a defendant has intellectual disability 
for the purpose of Atkins.37 The Hall Court noted that the Atkins majority 
relied on clinical definitions from then-current Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th Edition (DSM-IV) to make its decision.38  
 
 31 See, e.g., People v. Mendoza, 62 Cal.4th 856, 911 (Cal. 2016) (rejecting defendant’s proposed 
exemption from the death penalty due to his mental illness in part because the “defendant [did] not 
offer a definition of what level of mental illness would constitute serious mental illness.”). 
 32 See Part II.B supra (explaining the definition of “severe mental illness”). 
 33 572 U.S. 701 (2014).  
 34 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017). 
 35 See Michelle Armstrong, Note, Addressing Defendants Who Are “Crazy, But Not Crazy Enough”: 
How Hall v. Florida Changes the Death Penalty For Mentally Ill Defendants, 47 U. TOL. L. REV. 
743, 753 (2016) (explaining reliance on medical expertise in Hall); Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1053 
(reasoning that “[t]he medical community’s current [intellectual disability] standards supply one 
constraint on States’ lee-way” to impose the death penalty).  
 36 See ABA Recommendation 122A, 7–9 (explaining the proposed significant impairment 
requirement). 
 37 Hall, 572 U.S. at 719–20. See also, Armstrong, supra note 35, at 753 (explaining reliance on medical 
experts in Hall). 
 38 Hall, 572 U.S. at 719 (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3). 
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The Hall Court followed this method by relying on the “views of medical 
experts” and noting that “this Court and the States have placed substantial 
reliance on the expertise of the medical profession” in determining the 
category of people to whom Atkins would apply.39 The Court then required 
that the legal determination of intellectual disability be “informed by the 
medical community’s diagnostic framework.”40 
Three years later in Moore, the Supreme Court further required states to 
conform to the standards of medical professionals. The Court found that the 
“medical community’s current standards supply one constraint on States’ 
leeway” to implement the holding of Atkins.41 The Court cited clinical 
definitions in the most-recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders, DSM-5, as reflective of current medical community 
standards.42 The Supreme Court has thus required states to rely heavily on 
medical professionals in determining which defendants have intellectual 
disability for the purpose of applying Atkins. 
B. Adopting Medical Professionals’ Definition of “Severe Mental Illness” 
Would Resolve Basic Category Problems 
Relying on medical professionals’ definition of “severe mental illness,” 
similarly to reliance on the clinical definition of “intellectual disability” in 
Atkins cases, would resolve basic category problems of a new categorical 
prohibition. ABA Recommendation 122A’s definition of “severe mental 
illness” represents the position of relevant medical professional organizations 
on the category of mental illnesses that would qualify as “severe” enough to 
sufficiently reduce culpability. The Recommendation was officially endorsed 
by the American Psychological Association and the American Psychiatric 
Association.43 It defines “severe” as signifying “a disorder that is roughly 
equivalent to disorders that mental health professionals would consider the 
most serious ‘Axis I diagnoses.’ These disorders include schizophrenia and 
other psychotic disorders, mania, major depressive disorder, and dissociative 
disorders – with schizophrenia being by far the most common disorder seen 
in capital defendants.”44 The Recommendation also explains that “[s]ome 
 
 39 Id. at 721–22. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1053 (2017). The Supreme Court recently revisited Moore and 
once again reversed the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas. See Moore v. Texas, 
139 S.Ct. 666 (2019) (per curiam) (“We conclude that the appeals court’s opinion, when taken as a 
whole and when read in the light both of our prior opinion and the trial court record, rests upon 
analysis too much of which too closely resembles what we previously found improper.”). 
 42 Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1053. 
 43 ABA Recommendation 122, at 3. 
 44 Id. 
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conditions that are not considered an Axis I condition might also, on rare 
occasions, become ‘severe’ as that word is used in this Recommendation.”45 
Courts should rely on this definition of “severe mental illness” and medical 
professionals’ definitions of specific conditions to define the category for 
whom a new prohibition would apply. 
A new prohibition should also require an individuated determination that 
the severe mental illness caused the defendant significant impairment at the 
time of the crime. ABA Recommendation 122A includes this component.46 
This requirement is necessary because of the heterogeneity of symptoms 
among and within different mental illnesses.47 The Recommendation proposes 
three kinds that would qualify: if the defendant “had a severe mental disorder 
or disability that significantly impaired their capacity (a) to appreciate the 
nature, consequences or wrongfulness of their conduct, (b) to exercise rational 
judgment in relation to conduct, or (c) to conform their conduct to the 
requirements of law.”48 This is a reasonable and workable standard that is 
similar to many state insanity defenses.49 It is similar, but it is not already 
encompassed in the insanity defense because the insanity defense requires a 
stricter standard of complete lack of knowledge of what the person was doing 
or that it was wrong.50 Courts should include the significant impairment 
standard or something similar for a new categorical prohibition. This 
significant impairment requirement along with the “severe mental illness” 
requirement would resolve basic category problems in identifying people with 
reduced culpability. Resolving basic category problems would go a long way 
for creating a new categorical death penalty exemption for people with severe 
mental illness. The next sections examine current opinion on the issue and 
how a new prohibition may be created.   
 
 45 Id. at 6–7 (explaining that certain Axis II disorders may “at times experience more significant 
dysfunction[]” like personality disorder). 
 46 Id. at 7–9.  See id. at 7 (stating that the preclusion of a particular sentence based on diagnosis alone 
is not sensible because the disorders may greatly vary). 
 47 See id. at 7 (“[F]or the disorders covered by the second part of this Recommendation, preclusion of 
a death sentence based on diagnosis alone would not be sensible, because the symptoms of these 
disorders are much more variable than those associated with retardation or other disabilities covered 
by the Recommendation’s first paragraph.”). 
 48 Id. at 1. 
 49 See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 315(b) (2014)  
 
  “For purposes of this section, the phrase ‘legally insane’ means that, at the time of the 
commission of the offense, the actor was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease 
of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing or, if the actor did 
know the quality of the act, that he did not know that what he was doing was wrong.”  
 
 50 See id (requiring complete lack of knowledge of the “nature and quality of the act” or that one “did 
not know that what he was doing was wrong” to qualify for the insanity defense). 
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IV. CURRENT OPINION ON THE ISSUE  
At this time, courts are unlikely to create a new prohibition on executing 
people with severe mental illness because there is not enough evidence of a 
national consensus against the practice.51 This could change, however, if more 
legislatures adopt the proposal of a prohibition on executing people who were 
significantly impaired at the time of their crime from severe mental illness. 
The Supreme Court in Atkins and Roper focused heavily on legislation and 
legislative trends in finding a national consensus existed for prohibiting the 
death penalty for people with intellectual disability and juveniles.52 On the issue 
of an exemption for people with severe mental illness, only one state, 
Connecticut, has ever passed legislation creating such an exemption.53 This 
heavily weighted factor alone likely dooms any finding of a national 
consensus.54 Other relevant factors generally support an exemption but are not 
as heavily weighted as the legislative trend.55 Based on these factors, every court 
that has considered the issue has found that no national consensus against the 
practice exists.56 Lack of national consensus makes it extremely unlikely, but 
not impossible, that a new judicially created exemption will be created for 
people with severe mental illness until supporting legislation is passed.57 This 
section examines current and historical legislation on the issue as well as 
academic, popular, international, and medical and legal professional opinion 
on the issue. 
 
 51 See, e.g., State v. Kleypas, 382 P.3d 373, 445–46 (Kan. 2016) (listing cases that have declined “to 
extend the Atkins and Roper rationale to the mentally ill” and concluding there is a “lack of legislative 
direction”). 
 52 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312 (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989) (“[T]he clearest and 
most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country’s 
legislatures.”) (internal quotations omitted). See also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564–67 (2005) 
(comparing state legislation in order to determine whether there is a national consensus); Atkins, 536 
U.S. at 315 (“It is not so much the number of these States that is significant, but the consistency of 
the direction of change.”) (footnote omitted). 
 53 Kleypas, 382 P.3d at 445. See also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a(h) (2009) (abolishing the death 
penalty for persons with intellectual disabilities or persons whose mental capacity was significantly 
impaired).  Connecticut subsequently abolished the death penalty completely in 2012. See Kleypas, 
382 P.3d at 445. 
 54 See cases cited supra note 52 (“[T]he clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary 
values is the legislation enacted by the country’s legislatures.”) (internal quotations omitted).  
 55 See infra Part IV.B.  
 56 See Part V infra. 
 57 Courts also conduct an independent analysis of the issue in addition to considering whether a national 
consensus exists. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 564 (“We then must determine, in the exercise of our 
own independent judgment, whether the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for 
juveniles.”). 
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A. Legislation on the Issue  
In creating exemptions from the death penalty, the Supreme Court has 
focused extensively on legislative opinion on an issue.58 The Atkins Court 
relied heavily on “objective” factors, particularly state legislation, in prohibiting 
the execution of people with intellectual disability.59 The Court noted that 
eighteen states and the federal government had laws prohibiting the execution 
of people with intellectual disability and similar laws had passed at least one 
house in a minimum of three other states.60 The Court emphasized that in 
considering the persuasive force of legislation it “is not so much the number 
of these States that is significant, but the consistency of the direction of 
change.”61 The Court concluded that this factor and others “unquestionably 
reflects widespread judgment about the relative culpability of mentally 
retarded offenders[.]”62 The majority also relied on the opinions medical 
professional organizations, religious groups in the United States, foreign law, 
and polling data.63 Three years later, a similar majority64 in Roper relied on 
similar data to prohibit the execution of juveniles.65 
 
 58 See cases cited supra note 52 (“[T]he clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary 
values is the legislation enacted by the country’s legislatures.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 59 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312–17 (analyzing state legislation prohibiting the execution of people with 
intellectual disability). 
 60 Id. at 313–16. See also id. at 313–15 (noting that U.S. Congress, Georgia, Maryland, Kentucky, 
Tennessee, New Mexico, Arkansas, Colorado, Washington, Indiana, Kansas, New York, Nebraska, 
South Dakota, Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Missouri, and North Carolina have prohibited the 
execution of persons with intellectual disabilities and similar bills have passed at least in one house 
of other States).  
 61 Id. at 315 (footnote omitted). This statement was likely in response to strong criticism by the 
dissenting Justices who argued that eighteen states - less than half of states that employ the death 
penalty at the time - do not constitute a national consensus.  Id. at 342–44 (Scalia, J. dissenting). 
 62 Id. at 317. 
 63 Id. at 316–17 n.21. The dissenting Justices, however, sharply criticized the use of these facts as 
evidence of national consensus.  Id. at 347–48 (Scalia, J. dissenting). 
 64 The majority in Atkins included Justices Stevens, O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and 
Breyer.  Dissenters included Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.  
The majority in Roper included Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.  Dissenters 
included Justices Rehnquist, O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas. See, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 
587,607 (2005).  Justice O’Connor was the only justice to change position, from the majority in Atkins 
to the dissent in Roper. 
 65 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 564  
 
  “The evidence of national consensus against the death penalty for juveniles is similar, and in 
some respects parallel, to the evidence Atkins held sufficient to demonstrate a national 
consensus against the death penalty for the mentally retarded . . . . By a similar calculation in this 
case, 30 States prohibit the juvenile death penalty, comprising 12 that have rejected the death 
penalty altogether and 18 that maintain it but, by express provision or judicial interpretation, 
exclude juveniles from its reach.” 
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There is unfortunately no similar legislative trend toward prohibiting the 
death penalty for people with severe mental illness.66  Only one state, 
Connecticut, has ever passed such legislation.67 The 2009 Connecticut 
legislation prohibited the execution of defendants if “the defendant’s mental 
capacity was significantly impaired or the defendant’s ability to conform the 
defendant’s conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired but 
not so impaired in either case as to constitute a defense to prosecution.”68 This 
model conforms with the proposal above of a “severe mental illness” and 
“significant impairment” requirement. This law is not still on the books, 
however, because Connecticut subsequently abolished the death penalty in 
2012.69  
Other state legislatures in Kentucky, North Carolina, Indiana, and 
Tennessee have considered similar legislation but none of have passed it.70 
The Kentucky and North Carolina legislatures have both considered 
legislation with wording directly from ABA Recommendation 122A.71 Indiana 
considered proposed legislation in 2009 to ban the execution of individuals 
with ‘severe mental illness,’ defined as a diagnosis of schizophrenia, 
schizoaffective disorder, bipolar disorder, major depression, or delusional 
disorder.72 A bill has also been recently proposed in South Carolina with 
language similar to ABA Recommendation 122A.73 Considering that there is 
 
 66 See State v. Kleypas, 382 P.3d 373, 445 (Kan. 2016) (finding no legislative trend towards extending 
Atkins and Roper to persons with a mental illness). 
 67 Id.  
 68 Id.;  CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a–46a(h)(2) (2009). 
 69 Kleypas, 382 P.3d at 445. 
 70 Id. (“Kleypas cites relatively recent bills introduced in the legislatures of Kentucky, North Carolina, 
Indiana, and Tennessee . . . . However, none of these states actually passed legislation and all of them 
still retain the death penalty.”). 
 71 See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, Resources on Severe Mental Illness and Death Penalty, (Nov. 
29, 2018) 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/projects/death_penalty_due_process_review_project/serio
us-mental-illness-initiative-/resources0/ (listing proposed legislation prohibiting the death penalty for 
people with severe or serious mental illness). 
 72 Id. 
 73 Elle Klein, Flying over the Cuckoo’s Nest: How the Mentally Ill Landed into an Unconstitutional 
Punishment in South Carolina, 68 S.C. L. REV. 571, 595 (2017)  
 
  Bill 3535, currently residing in the House Judiciary Committee, was proposed to the South 
Carolina legislature in February 2015. This bill would ban the execution of an offender that 
had a severe mentally disability at the time of the commission of the crime. The bill defines 
severe mental disability as “a severe mental illness that significantly impairs a person’s capacity 
to do any of the following: (i) appreciate the nature, consequences, or wrongfulness of the 
person’s conduct; (ii) exercise rational judgment in relation to conduct; or (iii) conform the 
person’s conduct to the requirements of the law . . .” or as “dementia or traumatic brain injury 
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no current legislation prohibiting the execution of people significantly 
impaired by severe mental illness at the time of their crime and only one state 
has ever done so, there is no legislative trend against these executions. 
B. Academic, Popular, International, and Medical Professional Opinion 
Academic, popular, international, and medical professional opinion can 
also be evidence that a national consensus exists74 but offer mixed results on a 
death penalty exemption for people with severe mental illness. These factors 
do not universally support the position and are not as heavily weighted as 
legislative trend.75  
Academic opinion presents mixed reviews of a new death penalty 
prohibition. The possibility of a new death penalty exemption for people with 
severe mental illness was considered by legal commentators soon after the 
2002 Atkins decision, including articles in 2003 by Christopher Slobogin and 
Dr. Douglas Mossman.76 Slobogin argued that allowing the executions of 
people with severe mental illness while at the same time prohibiting the 
execution of people with intellectual disability violates the Equal Protection 
Clause.77 Slobogin presented an interesting argument but it has not gained any 
traction.78 Dr. Mossman, a psychiatrist, advocated for a different approach. He 
argued that Atkins was wrongly decided and should not be extended to people 
with severe mental illness.79 Mossman argued that Atkins mistakenly treats 
people with intellectual disability as a discrete group, improperly requires 
relying on diagnoses to make legal decisions, and unwisely requires 
considering extending the prohibition to other psychiatric disabilities.80 It may 
also negatively affect discrimination against people with intellectual disability.81 
Subsequent articles by other commentators have been mostly supportive of 
 
that results in significantly sub-average general intellectual functioning, existing concurrently 
with significant limitations in adaptive functioning” (citations omitted). 
 
 74 See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316–17 n.21 (2002) (finding academic, popular, international, and medical 
professional opinion relevant to whether a national consensus existed against the execution of people 
with intellectual disability). 
 75 See cases cited supra note 52 (“the clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary 
values is the legislation enacted by the country’s legislatures”). 
 76 See generally Slobogin, supra note 8; Douglas Mossman, Atkins v. Virginia: A Psychiatric Can of 
Worms, 33 N.M. L. REV. 255 (2003). 
 77 Slobogin, supra note 8.  
 78 See discussion in Part V infra (showing that no courts have accepted that executing defendants with 
severe mental illness violates the Equal Protection clause). 
 79 Mossman, supra note 76, at 256. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. at 272–73. This article answers these objections in the discussion of Part VI, infra. 
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prohibiting the execution of people with severe mental illness.82 More 
consensus would have to be reached in order to consider this factor to weigh 
heavily in favor of a new death penalty prohibition. 
On public opinion, few polls have been conducted on the issue but the 
few seem to support prohibiting the execution of people with severe mental 
illness. A 2014 Public Policy Polling national survey of 943 registered voters 
found that 58 percent opposed death penalty eligibility for people with mental 
illness, 28 percent supported eligibility, and 14 percent were not sure.83 
According to the poll, the divide was not along political lines as Republicans, 
Democrats, and Independents all opposed death penalty eligibility for people 
with mental illness.84 Similarly, a 2015 multi-state voter survey found that 66 
percent of voters supported a death penalty exemption for mental illness again 
across the political spectrum.85 Many more comprehensive studies would have 
to be done to draw significant conclusions on public opinion of the issue. For 
example, the Atkins court considered more than thirty public opinion polls 
when deciding that case.86 
On international opinion, many international organizations oppose the 
execution of people with severe mental illness, but the relevance of 
 
 82 See, e.g., Aurélie Tabuteau Mangels, Should Individuals with Severe Mental Illness Continue to Be 
Eligible for the Death Penalty, 32  CRIM. JUST. 9, 11–13 (2017) (supporting a categorical prohibition 
on execution of people with severe mental illness); Lyn Entzeroth, The Challenge And Dillemna Of 
Charting A Course To Constitutionally Protect The Severely Mentally Ill Capital Defendant From 
The Death Penalty, 44 AKRON L. REV. 529, 561 (2011) (supporting a severe mental illness 
exemption and analyzing the “tough road ahead” for its possibility); Pamela A. Wilkins, Rethinking 
Categorical Prohibitions on Capital Punishment: How the Current Test Fails Mentally Ill Offenders 
and What to Do About It, 40 U. MEM. L. REV. 423, 470–71 (supporting a categorical prohibition on 
execution of people with severe mental illness); William W. Berry III, Evolved Standards, Evolving 
Justices? The Case For A Broader Application of the Eighth Amendment, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 
106, 131 (2018) (supporting an expansion of Atkins to prohibit the death penalty for people with 
severe mental illness). But see Joseph Hess, The Death Penalty for Mentally Ill Offenders: Atkins, 
Roper, and Mitigation Factors Militate Against Categorical Exemption, 90 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 
93, 111 (2012) (arguing against a categorical exemption because no “objective indicia” indicate that 
executing people with severe mental illness has become unusual and mental illness as a mitigating 
factor offers enough protection); Mark E. Coon, Drawing the Line at Atkins and Roper: The Case 
Against Additional Categorical Exemptions from Capital Punishment for Offenders with Conditions 
Affecting Brain Function, 115 W. VA. L. REV. 1221, 1224 (2013) (arguing against extending 
categorical exemption from capital punishment to “additional classes of offenders”). 
 83 Poll: Americans Oppose Executing Mentally Ill By 2-to-1 Margin, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION 
CENTER (Dec. 1, 2014), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/news/poll-americans-oppose-death-penalty-for-
mentally-ill-by-2-1. 
 84 Id. (listing the percentage of members in each political party that opposes executing the mentally ill: 
Democrats 62%, Republicans 59%, Independents 51%). 
 85 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION DEATH PENALTY DUE PROCESS REVIEW PROJECT, SEVERE 
MENTAL ILLNESS AND THE DEATH PENALTY (2016) [hereinafter ABA Report 2016], at 36.  
 86 See Atkins, 536 U.S at 328–36 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting) (listing “Poll and survey results reported in 
Brief for American Association on Mental Retardation et al.”). 
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international opinion is greatly contested by judges. Many international 
organizations have advocated for a prohibition against executing people with 
severe mental illness.87 The Atkins majority considered international opinion 
relevant to whether a consensus exists against the practice.88  The Roper 
majority similarly acknowledged “the overwhelming weight of international 
opinion against the juvenile death penalty” when deciding to prohibit it.89  
International opposition to executing people with severe mental illness may 
be similarly overwhelming. The United Nations (U.N.) Commission on 
Human Rights, the U.N. General Assembly, the European Union, the 
Council of Europe, and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
have all advocated for a prohibition against executing people with mental 
illness.90  The European Union, which opposes the death penalty entirely, has 
called on countries that still maintain the death penalty to prohibit the 
execution of “persons suffering from any mental illness.”91 Advocacy by the 
European Union may have some persuasive force for courts, as the Atkins 
majority cited the European Union position as persuasive evidence in creating 
a categorical prohibition on the execution of people with intellectual 
disability.92 However, international opinion is not controlling and is generally 
considered to be only marginally relevant compared to other factors.93 Some 
judges, particularly conservative judges, do not consider international opinion 
relevant at all.94  The persuasiveness of international opinion is thus 
questionable at best. 
On medical professional opinion: Major medical professional 
organizations support a new prohibition on executing people with severe 
mental illness who were significantly impaired at the time of their crime. 95  The 
Supreme Court in Atkins relied in part on the opinion of medical professional 
organizations in finding a national consensus existed against executing people 
with intellectual disability.96  The major organizations cited by the Supreme 
 
 87 See ABA Report 2016, at 35–36 (listing international organizations that have advocated for an 
exemption from the death penalty for people with mental illness).  
 88 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316–17 n.21. 
 89 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). 
 90 ABA Report 2016, at 35–36. 
 91 ABA Report 2016, at 35. 
 92 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n. 21. 
 93 See, e.g., Runyon v. Virginia, 228 F.Supp.3d 569, 649 (E.D. Va. 2017) (finding international cases 
and law to be less instructive than state and federal cases that have addressed the issue). 
 94 The dissenters in Atkins and Roper considered international opinion totally irrelevant. See Atkins, 
536 U.S. at 322 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s use of “foreign laws”). 
 95 See ABA Recommendation 122A, at 3 (“The American Psychiatric Association and the American 
Psychological Association have officially endorsed the Task Force’s proposal.”). 
 96 See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316–17 n.21 (citing briefs by the American Psychological Association et al. 
and the AAMR [American Association on Mental Retardation et al.] as relevant evidence to the 
existence of a national consensus). 
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Court currently support a death penalty exemption for people with severe 
mental illness.97  However, some judges have expressed doubts about whether 
medical professional opinion should be relied on.98  Medical professional 
opinion thus offers mixed results. 
In Atkins, the majority relied in part on the opinion of medical 
professional organizations to find that a national consensus existed against 
executing people with intellectual disability.99 In footnote 21 of Atkins, the 
Court found that “Additional evidence makes it clear that this legislative 
judgment [against the execution of people with intellectual disability] reflects a 
much broader social and professional consensus.”100 To demonstrate 
professional consensus, the Court noted that “several organizations with 
germane expertise have adopted official positions opposing the imposition of 
the death penalty upon a mentally retarded offender.”101  As examples of these 
organizations that have “germane expertise” that adopted this official position, 
the Court cited two briefs.102  The first was an amicus brief for the American 
Psychological Association,103 the American Psychiatric Association,104 and the 
American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law.105  The second was an amicus 
brief for the American Association on Mental Retardation (now named the 
 
 97 See ABA recommendation 122A, at 3.  
 98 See, e.g., United States v. Sampson, 2015 WL 7962394, at *12 (D. Mass. 2015) (“Recognizing that 
this court may consider the views of the professional organizations that [the defendant] cites, the court 
finds that they are not as important indicia of contemporary values as the actions of legislatures.”). 
 99 See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316–17 n.21 (2002) (discussing briefs by the American Psychological 
Association et al. and the AAMR [American Association on Mental Retardation] et al. as relevant 
evidence to the existence of a national consensus). 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. 
 103 The American Psychological Association describes itself as “the leading scientific and professional 
organization representing psychology in the United States, with more than 118,000 researchers, 
educators, clinicians, consultants and students as its members.” About Us, AMERICAN 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION (last visited Feb. 25, 2019), https://www.apa.org/about/index.   
 104 The American Psychiatric Association describes itself as having “more than 38,500 members 
involved in psychiatric practice, research, and academia representing the diversity of the patients for 
whom they care. As the leading psychiatric organization in the world, APA now encompasses 
members practicing in more than 100 countries.” About APA, AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC 
ASSOCIATION (last visited Feb. 25, 2019), https://www.psychiatry.org/about-apa.   
 105 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316–17 n.21. See also Brief for American Psychological Association et al. as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, McCarver v. North Carolina, 533 U.S. 975 (2001) (No. 00-
8727). The American Psychological Academy of Psychiatry and the Law [AAPL] describes itself as 
“an organization of psychiatrists dedicated to excellence in practice, teaching, and research in forensic 
psychiatry. Founded in 1969, AAPL currently has over 2,000 members in North America and 
around the world.” About the Organization, AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 
(last visited Feb. 25, 2019), http://www.aapl.org/organization.  
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American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities).106    
The Atkins Court thus used the opinion of medical professional organizations 
as evidence in determining whether a national consensus exists against 
imposing the death penalty on certain groups.107 
Relevant medical professional organizations have adopted official 
positions opposing the imposition of the death penalty on defendants with 
severe mental illness.108  The American Psychological Association and the 
American Psychiatric Association have officially endorsed this position.109  
These associations were cited by the Supreme Court in Atkins footnote 21 as 
having “germane expertise” on a death penalty exemption for people with 
intellectual disability.110 Their opinion should therefore be considered 
evidence for whether a professional consensus exists against the execution of 
people with severe mental illness.  
The American Psychological Association and the American Psychiatric 
Association’s endorsement of American Bar Association Recommendation 
122A reflects their official position on the issue.111 The Recommendation 
resulted from the assembly of a “Task Force on Mental Disability and the 
Death Penalty” that met shortly after the decision in Atkins between April 
2003 and March 2005.112 The Task Force was “composed of 24 lawyers and 
mental health professionals (both practitioners and academics), and included 
members of the American Psychiatric Association and the American 
Psychological Association.”113 The Recommendation in part recommends the 
prohibition of the “execution of persons with severe mental disabilities whose 
 
 106 The AAMR is now named the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities 
[AAIDD). See About Us, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON INTELLECTUAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL 
DISABILITIES (last visited Feb. 25, 2019), https://aaidd.org/about-aaidd (noting that the AAIDD is 
the new name of AAMR). The organization describes itself as having “membership over 5,000 strong 
in the United States and in 55 countries worldwide, AAIDD is the leader in advocating quality of life 
and rights for those with intellectual disabilities.” Id. 
 107 The dissenters in Atkins, however, did not agree that the opinion of medical professional 
organizations was relevant. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 324 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting) (“In my view, these 
two sources–the work product of legislatures and sentencing jury determinations–ought to be the sole 
indicators by which courts ascertain the contemporary American conceptions of decency for 
purposes of the Eighth Amendment.”). 
 108 See ABA Report 2016, at 1 (“It has now been 10 years since the American Bar Association (ABA), 
in conjunction with the American Psychiatric Association, American Psychological Association and 
National Alliance on Mental Illness (NAMI) adopted a policy opposing the death penalty for 
individuals with severe mental disorders or disabilities present at the time a crime is committed . . . 
.”). 
 109 Id. 
 110 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316–17 n.21. 
 111 ABA Recommendation 122A, at 3 (stating that The American Psychiatric Association and the 
American Psychological Association have endorsed the Task Force’s proposal). 
 112 Id.  
 113 Id. 
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demonstrated impairments of mental and emotional functioning at the time 
of the offense would render a death sentence disproportionate to their 
culpability.”114 The relevant medical professional organizations thus support an 
exemption on the death penalty for people with severe mental illness. Medical 
professional organizations’ opinion supports the finding of a national 
consensus on the issue. 
V. COURTS THAT HAVE ADDRESSED THE ISSUE 
Every court that has considered the issue has found a lack of national 
consensus and declined to create a categorical death penalty exemption for 
people with severe mental illness.115 Federal courts that have considered and 
rejected a new categorical exemption include the 5th Circuit,116 the 6th 
Circuit,117 the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces,118 the District of 
Massachusetts,119 the Northern District of Oklahoma,120 and the Eastern 
District of Virginia.121 State courts that have similarly considered the issue 
 
 114 Id. at 5. 
 115 See State v. Kleypas, 382 P.3d 373, 445 (Kan. 2016) (listing many cases that have addressed the issue 
and explaining that the “lack of legislative direction has also led courts who have considered the issue 
to decline to extend the Atkins and Roper rationale to the mentally ill.”). 
 116 See Mays v. Stephens, 757 F.3d 211, 219 (5th Cir. 2014) (“Mays seeks a COA on the ground that 
the Eighth Amendment prohibits his execution because he is mentally ill. Fifth Circuit precedent 
however, forecloses that.”). 
 117 See Franklin v. Bradshaw, 695 F.3d 439, 455 (6th Cir. 2012) (declining to extend Atkins). 
 118 See United States v. Akbar, 74 M.J. 364, 406 (Armed Forces App. 2015) (noting that “courts have 
uniformly determined that there is no constitutional impediment to imposing a capital sentence 
where a criminal defendant suffers from a mental illness.”) (footnote omitted). 
 119 See United States v. Sampson, 2015 WL 7962394 at *13 (D. Mass. 2015) (“However ‘severe’ mental 
illness is defined, the defendant has not identified objective indicia sufficient to prove that current 
standards of decency are incompatible with imposing a death sentence on a person suffering from a 
severe mental illness.”). 
 120 See Thacker v. Workman, 2010 WL 3466707 at *24 (N.D. Okla. 2010) (“Neither Atkins nor Roper 
established, let alone clearly established, a rule that it would be a constitutional violation to execute 
persons suffering from a mental disorder such as bipolar disorder.”). 
 121 See Runyon v. United States, 228 F.Supp.3d 569, 649 (E.D. Va. 2017) (“After evaluating the 
decisions by both federal and state courts that have chosen not to extend Roper and Atkins, this court 
finds it inappropriate to extend the holdings or the reasoning in Atkins and Roper to defendants with 
severe mental illness, absent Supreme Court authority.”). 
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include the highest courts of California,122 Florida,123 Georgia,124 Idaho,125 
Indiana,126 Kansas,127 Kentucky,128 Missouri,129 Ohio,130 and Pennsylvania131 as 
well as criminal appeals courts in Alabama,132 Oklahoma,133 Tennessee,134 and 
Texas.135  These cases represent analysis of the issue in more than half of the 
United States jurisdictions that currently have the death penalty on the 
books.136 Most of these cases contain limited analysis of the issue and simply 
list other cases that have addressed the issue or lack of Supreme Court support 
and find that no prohibition has been created.137 Though no majority opinion 
has accepted an argument to extend Atkins to people with severe mental 
 
 122 See People v. Mendoza, 62 Cal. 4th 856, 911 (Cal. 2016) (rejecting the defendant’s request to extend 
Atkins and Roper). 
 123 See Simmons v. State, 105 So.3d 475, 511 (Fla. 2012) (explaining that the Florida Supreme Court 
has recently and repeatedly rejected claims to bar the death penalty for defendants with severe mental 
illness). 
 124 See Lewis v. State, 620 S.E. 2d. 778, 786 (Ga. 2005) (“Lewis also does not cite any authority that 
establishes a constitutional prohibition on convicting and sentencing to death a defendant who is 
competent but mentally ill, and we decline to extend the holdings of cases like Atkins that he cites as 
being analogous.”).  
 125 See State v. Dunlap, 313 P.3d 1, 36  (Idaho 2013) (“We join these courts in holding that a defendant’s 
mental illness does not prevent imposition of a capital sentence.”). 
 126 See Matheney v. State, 833 N.E.2d 454, 458 (Ind. 2005) (“Matheney has not convinced us that he 
has a reasonable possibility of establishing that mentally ill persons are on the same footing as 
mentally retarded persons under the Atkins rationale.”). 
 127 See State v. Kleypas, 382 P.3d 373, 448 (Kan. 2016) (concluding that “the Eighth Amendment does 
not categorically prohibit the execution of offenders who are severely mentally ill at the time of their 
crimes.”).  
 128 See Dunlap v. Com., 435 S.W.3d 537, 616 (Ky. 2013) (“We are not prepared to hold that mentally 
ill persons are categorically ineligible for the death penalty.”). 
 129 See State v. Johnson, 207 S.W.3d 24, 51 (Mo. 2006) (en banc) (refusing to extend Atkins to people 
with mental illness). 
 130 See State v. Mammone, 13 N.E.3d 1051, 1089  (Ohio 2014) (finding that “the Eighth Amendment 
does not bar the execution of the seriously mentally ill . . . .”). 
 131 See Com. v. Baumhammers, 599 Pa. 1, 61–63 (Pa. 2008) (refusing to extend Atkins to people with 
mental illness). 
 132 See Dotch v. State, 67 So.3d 936, 1006 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010) (refusing to “extend or expand the 
constitutional prohibitions against the application of the death penalty . . . .”). 
 133 See Malone v. State, 293 P.3d 198, 216 (Okla. Crim. App. 2013) (“We expressly reject that the 
Atkins rule or rationale applies to the mentally ill.”). 
 134 See Pike v. State, 2011 WL 1544207, at *67–68 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2011) (declining to extend Roper 
or Atkins). 
 135 See Mays v. State, 318 S.W.3d 368, 379 (Tex. Crim. 2010) (rejecting an extension of Atkins or 
Roper). 
 136 These jurisdictions include the fourteen states listed above as well as the U.S. government and U.S. 
military. See State by State, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER (last visited Sept. 11, 2019), 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty (listing the thirty one jurisdictions in the 
United States that institute the death penalty). 
 137 See, e.g., State v. Dunlap, 313 P.3d 1, 36 (Idaho 2013) (listing the other cases that have considered 
the issue and concluding that the Supreme Court of Idaho would “join these courts in holding that a 
defendant’s mental illness does not prevent imposition of a capital sentence.”). 
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illness, some judges have accepted it in concurring or dissenting opinions.138 
This of course has little to no weight as evidence of national consensus.  
The fact that no court has found a national consensus exists against the 
practice and no new legislation against it has been passed dooms the finding 
of a national consensus. This could change, though, if new legislation is passed. 
State legislatures should consider the above arguments about the reduced 
culpability of people with severe mental illness significantly impaired at the 
time of their crime to create a new prohibition of this kind. It would be a 
benefit to their own state and possibly the whole country because if a trend 
can be created, then a national consensus could be found against the practice 
nationwide.  
VI. THE PARTIAL SUCCESS OF THIS APPROACH IN KLEYPAS 
The 2016 Kansas Supreme Court case State v. Kleypas139 illustrates how 
this approach may work with reliance on medical professionals’ definition of 
“severe mental illness.”  In 2016, the Kansas Supreme Court considered a 
request made by death row defendant Gary Kleypas to create a categorical 
death penalty exemption for people who had severe mental illness at the time 
of their crime.140 The court’s decision on the issue was remarkable for its 
preliminary acceptance of Kleypas’s proposed category of people to whom the 
exception would apply by reference to ABA Recommendation 122A.141 The 
court also found that Kleypas had standing to raise the issue because several 
experts had diagnosed him with schizophrenia and dissociative disorders, 
which would qualify as “severe” under the ABA Recommendation 122A 
criteria.142 However, the court denied Kleypas’s proposal because they found 
that no national consensus existed against the executions and in the court’s 
independent judgment a categorical prohibition was not necessary.143 Although 
the Kleypas court only accepted the reliance on medical professional 
 
 138 See, e.g., Bryan v. Mullin, 335 F.3d 1207, 1227–28 (10th Cir. 2003) (Henry, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (invoking Atkins to argue that the execution of a mentally ill defendant 
contributes nothing to the goals of retribution or deterrence and is unconstitutional); Corcoran v. 
State, 774 N.E.2d 495, 502 (Ind. 2002) (Rucker, J., dissenting) (“[T]he underlying rationale for 
prohibiting executions of the mentally retarded is just as compelling for prohibiting executions of the 
seriously mentally ill . . . .”); Joshua v. Adams, 231 Fed. App’x 592, 599 (9th Cir. 2007) (Ferguson, 
J., dissenting) (arguing that the execution of a mentally ill defendant violates the Eighth Amendment 
because mental illness reduces culpability). 
 139 State v. Kleypas, 382 P.3d. 373 (Kan. 2016). 
 140 Id. at 443. Kleypas should have proposed a solution similar to the one outlined here. 
 141 See id. at 443–44 (citing ABA Recommendation 122A at length and concluding that “these standards 
set out a specific enough category to allow consideration of Kleypas’ arguments.”). 
 142 Id. at 444. 
 143 Id. at 444–48. 
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standards to define “severe mental illness” for the preliminary questions in the 
case, the decision marks a significant step on the issue and indicates how it 
may be successful in the future. 
A. Kleypas Factual Background 
Gary Kleypas’ factual and procedural situation represents a typical 
situation for defendants arguing for a new death penalty exemption based on 
severe mental illness. His crime was horrific, but there was substantial 
evidence that he was significantly impaired by severe mental illness at the time 
of his crime.  
Kleypas was convicted for the 1996 murder, attempted rape, and 
aggravated burglary of a woman C.W.144 The state offered evidence of several 
aggravating factors in seeking the death penalty.145 These included Kleypas’s 
previous conviction for the 1977 murder of a Missouri woman and the 
heinous nature of his murder of C.W.146 He forced himself inside her 
apartment, attempted to rape her, stabbed her repeatedly in the chest when 
she struggled, and stole her engagement ring and other things from her purse.147 
He then disposed of some of her things in a dumpster, returned to his 
apartment, and planned to leave town before his arrest.148 
In his defense, Kleypas offered evidence of several mitigating factors that 
focused primarily on his history of chronic mental illness and “severely 
deteriorated” mental state at the time of his crime.149 He called many witnesses 
to support these claims.150 Dr. Marilyn Hutchinson, a mitigation specialist and 
clinical and forensic psychologist, evaluated him between 2002 and 2004 and 
“described him as severely disturbed with a history of chronic maladjustment 
that caused behavioral control problems.”151 She also described his many 
diagnoses beginning in 1977 that showed “a history of dissociation, psychotic 
and paranoid thoughts, schizophrenic activity, alcohol and drug abuse, sexual 
 
 144 Id. at 389–90. 
 145 Id. at 390–91. 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. at 390. 
 148 Id. at 390–91. 
 149 Id. at 391 (“In defense, Kleypas presented evidence of four mitigating circumstances: (1) Kleypas had 
a chronic mental illness and chronic maladjustment that had led to behavioral control problems 
throughout his life; (2) Kleypas’ mental status at the time of the crime was severely deteriorated; (3) 
when medicated, Kleypas’ mental status dramatically improved; and (4) Kleypas’ family had suffered 
a great deal and putting him to death would cause them additional suffering.”). 
 150 Kleypas’ witnesses included “a mitigation specialist who was a clinical and forensic psychologist; a 
clinical child psychologist; a psychologist who had researched factors that cause a risk of violence; a 
physician who had performed two brain scans on Kleypas; Kleypas’ mother; and two individuals who 
had supervised Kleypas when he had been incarcerated in a Missouri prison.” Id. 
 151 Id. 
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perversion, and a significant personality disorder.”152 Dr. Hutchinson 
described Kleypas’ mental state at the time of the crime as “being negatively 
affected by major depression with psychosis and agitation; paraphilia including 
very disturbed sexual ideas; a personality disorder not otherwise specified; 
traits of narcissism, avoidance, and dependency; a schizotypal personality; and 
antisocial behavior.”153 She based this opinion on observations by people who 
knew Kleypas around the time of the crime.154 Witnesses described his 
disturbed behavior including screaming for no reason and having 
hallucinations in his jail cell, and Dr. Hutchinson assigned him an extremely 
low global assessment of functioning (GAF) score.155 Evidence also suggested 
that Kleypas’ condition improved while he was on medication.156 In rebuttal, 
the state offered the testimony of Dr. William Logan, a forensic psychiatrist, 
who testified that Kleypas was triggered primarily by sexual attraction and 
committed the crime in an organized way to avoid detection suggesting lack of 
delusion and disorientation.157 The jury unanimously sentenced Kleypas to 
death, finding that the aggravating factors had been sufficient and were not 
outweighed by the mitigating factors.158 
B. Reliance on Medical Professional Organizations’ Definition of “Severe 
Mental Illness” in Kleypas 
The Kleypas court’s analysis is unique among cases that have addressed 
the issue because the court found that the standards of ABA Recommendation 
122A “set out a specific enough category to allow consideration of Kleypas’ 
arguments.”159 Kleypas asked the court to create a categorical prohibition on 
executing people with severe mental illness at the time of their crime and apply 
it to him.160 The state argued that the category of severe mental illness was 
incapable of definition.161 The court agreed with Kleypas that the category was 
capable of definition by relying on ABA Recommendation 122A and quoting 
its relevant language.162 The court further found that Kleypas had standing to 
raise the issue because several mental health professionals who examined him 
 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. at 391–92. 
 154 Id. at 392. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. at 392–93. 
 158 Id. at 393. 
 159 Id. at 444.  
 160 Id. at 443. 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. at 444. 
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diagnosed him with schizophrenia and dissociative disorders.163 These 
diagnoses are explicitly listed as qualifying for the “severe” requirement in 
ABA Recommendation 122A.164 
The Kansas Supreme Court’s position on the category differs from other 
courts that have addressed the issue. Some other courts that have addressed 
the issue found that the category of mental illness that would count as “severe” 
could not been established.165 By accepting the criteria of ABA 
Recommendation 122A for preliminary arguments, the Kansas Supreme 
Court demonstrated a potential resolution of category problems for a future 
prohibition on the execution of people with severe mental illness. 
Unfortunately, the Kansas Supreme Court did not adopt the prohibition 
proposed here and in ABA Recommendation 122A based on common 
objections.166 These and others are addressed in the following section.  
VII. OBJECTIONS 
This section will address the major objections to a proposal for a new 
prohibition on the execution of people with severe mental illness who were 
significantly impaired by their illness at the time of their crime. This article has 
already proposed solutions to the objection that “severe mental illness” cannot 
be defined by relying on the standards of medical professionals.167 It has also 
already proposed a solution to the individuation issue by proposing a 
requirement of “significant impairment.”168 The following three objections 
have not already been addressed and should be considered thoroughly by any 
legislature or court in considering whether to create a new prohibition. All 
three can be answered satisfactorily. 
A. The Reduced Culpability of People with Severe Mental Illness Can Be 
 
 163 Id. 
 164 ABA Recommendation 122A (2006). 
 165 See, e.g., People v. Mendoza, 62 Cal.4th 856, 911 (Cal. 2016) (finding that the “defendant does not 
offer a definition of what level of mental illness would constitute serious mental illness.”); State v. 
Hancock, 840 N.E.2d 1032, 1059 (Ohio 2006) (finding that the defendant did not sufficiently define 
“severe mental illness”). 
 166 See State v. Kleypas, 382 P.3d. 373, 446–48 (Kan. 2016) (rejecting a categorical prohibition of the 
death penalty based on the classification of mental illness). 
 167 See supra Part III(B). 
 168 See ABA Recommendation 122A (2006) (explaining the proposed “significant impairment” 
requirement). 
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Sufficiently Accounted for in Sentencing 
This objection argues that people with severe mental illness are already 
sufficiently protected in trial, sentencing, and execution procedures.169 At trial, 
defendants deemed “incompetent” cannot be prosecuted.170 Most states also 
have an “insanity defense” that exempts criminal defendants from full criminal 
punishment.171 The Supreme Court has further ruled that defendants who are 
“insane” at the time of execution cannot be executed.172 Mental illness can also 
be used as a mitigating factor in sentencing.173 The objection, accepted by some 
courts including the Kansas Supreme Court in Kleypas, argues that these 
protections sufficiently account for the reduced culpability of people with 
severe mental illness. As the Kleypas court explains, “We have confidence 
that Kansas juries can weigh a defendant’s mental state at the time of the crime 
as a mitigating factor for consideration in the decision of whether to return a 
death penalty verdict.”174 Unfortunately, however, the use of severe mental 
illness as a mitigating factor does not sufficiently account for reduced 
culpability as it did not for people with intellectual disability in Atkins and 
juveniles in Roper.  
The Supreme Court in Atkins and Roper determined that use as a 
mitigating factor was not sufficient to account for the reduced culpability of 
people with intellectual disability and juveniles, and the same rationale applies 
to people with severe mental illness. The Supreme Court in Atkins found that 
mitigation was not sufficient protection for people with intellectual disability 
 
 169 See, e.g., Kleypas, 382 P.3d at 447 (“We also note the protections already in place, which protect the 
incompetent from trial and the ‘insane’ from execution.”). 
 170 See, e.g., Jackson v. Indiana 406 U.S. 715, 719 (1972) (noting that the trial court found the defendant 
incompetent to stand trial and “ordered him committed to the Indiana Department of Mental Health 
until such time as that Department should certify to the court that ‘the defendant is sane.’”). 
 171 See Natalie Jacewicz, With No Insanity Defense, Seriously Ill People End Up In Prison, NPR (Aug. 
5, 2016, 10:06 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/08/05/487909967/with-no-
insanity-defense-seriously-ill-people-end-up-in-prison (listing Idaho, Kansas, Montana, and Utah as 
the four states without an insanity defense). 
 172 See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986) (“The Eighth Amendment prohibits the State 
from inflicting the penalty of death upon a prisoner who is insane.”). 
 173 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978)).  
(“In any capital case a defendant has wide latitude to raise as a mitigating factor ‘any aspect of [his or 
her] character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a 
basis for a sentence less than death.”). See also State v. Kleypas, 382 P.3d. 373, 447 (Kan. 2016) 
(“Finally, as Kleypas did here, mental illness can be asserted as a mitigator. While we recognize a 
distinction between disqualification and mitigation, we also recognize that presenting mental illness 
as a mitigatory allows the jury to consider culpability.”).  
 174 Kleypas, 382 P.3d. at 447. 
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because the condition inhibits fair consideration in sentencing.175 The Court 
explained that the impairments of people with intellectual disability are 
relevant not only because they reduce culpability, but because these 
“impairments can jeopardize the reliability and fairness of capital proceedings 
against [them].”176 The Court also noted that people with intellectual disability 
“may be less able to give meaningful assistance to their counsel and are 
typically poor witnesses, and their demeanor may create an unwarranted 
impression of lack of remorse for their crimes.”177 The same concerns are 
present for people with severe mental illness, who by the definition supplied 
by ABA Recommendation 122A often have “delusions (fixed, clearly false 
beliefs), hallucinations (clearly erroneous perceptions of reality), extremely 
disorganized thinking, or very significant disruption of consciousness, memory 
and perception of the environment.”178 These impairments, if present, would 
inhibit a defendant’s ability to assist in their own case. The concern may be 
mitigated somewhat by medication, but medication creates its own series 
problems due to difficult side effects which may make it more likely that a 
defendant has an unwarranted impression of lack of remorse for their 
crimes.179 
The Roper Court similarly found that the reduction in culpability of 
juveniles was not sufficiently protected by mitigation. The Court explained, 
“An unacceptable likelihood exists that the brutality or cold-blooded nature of 
any particular crime would overpower mitigating arguments based on youth as 
a matter of course, even where the juvenile offender’s objective immaturity, 
vulnerability, and lack of true depravity should require a sentence less severe 
than death.”180 The same rationale applies for people with severe mental 
illness. A capital case will always involve a heinous crime that often overpowers 
the mitigating factor of a defendant’s severe mental illness despite that 
defendant’s reduced culpability. The Supreme Court’s determinations in 
Atkins and Roper that mitigation was not sufficient protection for people with 
intellectual disability and juveniles thus makes any claim that it is sufficient 
protection for people with severe mental illness highly questionable.  
 
 175 See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (finding that “reliance on mental retardation as a mitigating factor can be 
a two-edged sword that may enhance the likelihood that the aggravating factor of future dangerousness 
will be found by the jury.”). 
 176 Id. at 306–07. 
 177 Id. at 320–21. 
 178 ABA Recommendation 122A, at 7. 
 179 See, What are possible side effects of antipsychotics? NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH,  
https://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/topics/mental-health-medications/index.shtml#part_149866 (listing 
the possible uncomfortable and painful side effects of antipsychotic medication). 
 180 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005). 
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B. Diagnoses Should Not Be Used for Legal Determinations 
The second major objection to a categorical prohibition for people with 
severe mental illness argues that diagnoses should not be used for legal 
determinations. This position was taken on the issue by Dr. Douglas Mossman 
shortly following Atkins. 181 Mossman points out that the American Psychiatric 
Association’s diagnostic manual includes a “Cautionary Statement” that “The 
clinical and scientific considerations involved in categorization of these 
conditions as mental disorders may not be wholly relevant to legal judgments, 
for example, that take into account such issues as individual responsibility.”182 
Mossman also cites the work of Professor Stephen Morse, who has “long 
believed that psychiatric diagnoses should play little or no role in legal 
proceedings.”183 Morse has argued that “the decision whether someone’s 
capacity for rationality is sufficient to hold him responsible ultimately is ‘a 
common sense inference,’ so that ‘the final judgment must be about the 
specific individual who is the potential subject of special mental health law 
treatment.’”184 If the ultimate determination of reduced capacity for rationality, 
or culpability, should focus only on the specific individual, then a categorical 
determination based on diagnoses would not be proper. Though this is a 
strong objection, it can be answered in two ways. 
First, the Supreme Court made the diagnosis of intellectual disability 
sufficient for a death penalty exemption under Atkins.185 In recent cases 
interpreting Atkins, the Court has in fact relied more heavily on clinical 
definitions to determine which defendants qualify for an exemption under 
Atkins.186 Relying on a diagnosis is thus permissible, and for Atkins cases 
required, under Supreme Court death penalty precedents creating a death 
penalty exemption. 
Second, the proposed prohibition for people with severe mental illness 
outlined in this article does not make diagnosis sufficient for the exemption to 
 
 181 See Mossman, supra note 76, at 287–89 (casting doubt on the value of psychiatric diagnoses for legal 
proceedings).  
 182 Id. at 272 (arguing that the then-current edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
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 186 See Part III(A), supra (explaining the increasing and continual reliance of the Supreme Court on 
clinical definitions for interpreting Atkins). 
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apply. ABA Recommendation 122A acknowledges that diagnosis alone 
should not be a basis for an exemption because of the heterogeneity of 
symptoms found in people with mental illness.187 The Recommendation 
therefore proposes a requirement of a qualifying diagnosis and a 
determination that impairment from the disease be “significant.”188 This was 
done to ensure that the defendant’s culpability was sufficiently lessened due to 
his or her condition, as for defendants with intellectual disability.189 If 
implemented, this significant impairment requirement would allow 
individualized consideration of the defendant’s culpability and would not rely 
entirely on diagnoses. 
C. Combating Stigma Should Require Treating People With Mental Illness 
As Fully Capable Agents 
In creating a new death penalty prohibition, legislatures or courts should 
consider the impact it may have on stigma and discrimination against people 
with severe mental illness. Mental health professionals have worked for a long 
time to “reduce the discrimination and stigma associated with having a mental 
disorder.”190 Creating a rule that recognizes the reduction of culpability for 
people with severe mental illness may imply that they are not fully capable 
agents.191 It might therefore increase stigma and discrimination, which is a 
heavy price to pay for an already stigmatized group. This concern, though 
highly important, can be answered in three ways. 
First, the Supreme Court has not discussed combating stigma and 
discrimination in creating death penalty prohibitions. The Atkins Court did 
not mention the decision’s potential impact on stigma or discrimination for 
people with intellectual disability.192 Nor did the Roper Court address the issue 
for juveniles.193 Concerns about stigma and discrimination have thus not been 
present in Supreme Court cases on death penalty exemptions and may not 
have to be considered for the creation of a new exemption. This may be 
implicit support by the Court for the idea that death penalty exemptions do 
not meaningfully increase stigma or discrimination. 
Second, the proposal discussed in this article and supported by mental 
health professional organizations does not solely rely on category 
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determinations but also includes a “significant impairment” requirement.194 
Implementation of the proposal would thus not imply that all people with 
severe mental illness are significantly impaired or anything less than fully 
capable agents. It would be a narrowly tailored exemption that ensures that a 
defendant meeting its conditions actually have impairments significant enough 
to reduce culpability. 
Third, death is different. Imposition of the death penalty is so final and 
serious that it can only be imposed on “the worst of the worst.”195 The proposal 
would still allow people with severe mental illness not found to be “insane” to 
be fully prosecuted and subject to harsh penalties including life imprisonment 
for serious crimes. Prohibition of the death penalty may thus only marginally 
impact stigma and discrimination. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
People who had severe mental illness at the time of their crime and 
significant impairment due to their illness should not be eligible for the death 
penalty. Creating such a prohibition would prevent a significant number of 
executions.196 It should be created because people with severe mental illness 
and significant impairment from their illness have sufficiently reduced 
culpability. A fruitful approach to creating such a prohibition is to rely on 
medical professionals to define the category of people with “severe mental 
illness.” This approach is supported by Atkins and recent Supreme Court 
cases interpreting Atkins. The success of this approach in the preliminary 
analysis of Kleypas, particularly the court’s reliance on ABA 
Recommendation 122A, demonstrates how it may be successful in the future. 
Objections to this approach can be addressed by the inclusion of a “significant 
impairment” requirement. A new prohibition on the execution of people with 
severe mental illness who were significantly impaired at the time of their crime 
should be created either judicially or legislatively. 
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